essentially no mystics, and the highest happiness must be something far
more solid than transcendental ecstasies. Surely, therefore, if it
exists at all we must be able somewhere to lay our hands upon it. It is
a pillar of fire by night; surely then it will be visible. It is to be
lifted up, and is to draw all men unto it. It is nothing if not this:
and we shall see more clearly if we consider the matter further.

This chief good, or this highest happiness, being the end of moral
action, one point about it is at once evident. Its value is of course
recognised by those who practise morality, or who enunciate moral
systems. Virtuous men are virtuous because the end gained by virtue is
an end that they desire to gain. But this is not enough; it is not
enough that to men who are already seeking the good the good should
appear in all its full attractiveness. It must be capable of being made
attractive for those who do not know it, and who have never sought it,
but who have, on the contrary, always turned away from everything that
is supposed to lead to it. It must be able, in other words, not only to
satisfy the virtuous of the wisdom of their virtue, it must be able to
convince the vicious of the folly of their vice. Vice is only bad in the
eye of the positive moralist because of the precious _something_ that we
are at the present moment losing by it. He can only convince us of our
error by giving us some picture of our loss. And he must be able to do
this, if his system is worth anything; and in promulgating his system he
professes that he can do it. The physician's work is to heal the sick;
his skill must not end in explaining his own health. It is clear that if
a morality is incapable of being preached, it is useless to say that it
is worthy of being practised. The statement will be meaningless, except
to those for whom it is superfluous. It is therefore essential to the
moral end that in some way or other it be generally presentable, so that
its excellence shall appeal to some common sense in man. And again, be