'Excellent; I want you to grow, and therefore I will leave that answer and
ask another question: Is not seeing perceiving?' 'Very true.' 'And he
who sees knows?' 'Yes.' 'And he who remembers, remembers that which he
sees and knows?' 'Very true.' 'But if he closes his eyes, does he not
remember?' 'He does.' 'Then he may remember and not see; and if seeing is
knowing, he may remember and not know. Is not this a "reductio ad
absurdum" of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception? Yet
perhaps we are crowing too soon; and if Protagoras, "the father of the
myth," had been alive, the result might have been very different. But he
is dead, and Theodorus, whom he left guardian of his "orphan," has not been
very zealous in defending him.'

Theodorus objects that Callias is the true guardian, but he hopes that
Socrates will come to the rescue. Socrates prefaces his defence by
resuming the attack. He asks whether a man can know and not know at the
same time? 'Impossible.' Quite possible, if you maintain that seeing is
knowing. The confident adversary, suiting the action to the word, shuts
one of your eyes; and now, says he, you see and do not see, but do you know
and not know? And a fresh opponent darts from his ambush, and transfers to
knowledge the terms which are commonly applied to sight. He asks whether
you can know near and not at a distance; whether you can have a sharp and
also a dull knowledge. While you are wondering at his incomparable wisdom,
he gets you into his power, and you will not escape until you have come to
an understanding with him about the money which is to be paid for your
release.

But Protagoras has not yet made his defence; and already he may be heard
contemptuously replying that he is not responsible for the admissions which
were made by a boy, who could not foresee the coming move, and therefore
had answered in a manner which enabled Socrates to raise a laugh against