themselves. _Why and how?_ (1) First and foremost because until then the
State is not master in its own house, and cannot make those experiments
in modifying conditions in the industry which I believe to be essential
to bring it into a healthy condition instead of being a standing menace
to the equilibrium of the State--as it was before the war, and during
the war, and has been since the war; (2) the technical difficulties and
obstacles resulting from the ownership of the minerals being in the
hands of several thousand private landowners and preventing the economic
working of coal are enormous. You will find abundant evidence of this
second statement in the testimony given by Sir Richard Redmayne and the
late Mr. James Gemmell and others before the Sankey Commission in 1919.

How is the State to acquire them? Not piece-meal, but once and for all
in one final settlement, by an Act of Parliament providing adequate
compensation in the form of State securities. The assessment of the
compensation is largely a technical problem, and there is nothing
insuperable about it. It is being done every day for the purpose of
death duties, transfer on sale, etc. Supposing, for the sake of
argument, 551/2 millions sterling is the total capital value of the
royalties, an ingenious method which has been recommended is to set
aside that sum not in cash but in bonds and appoint a tribunal to divide
it equitably amongst all the mineral-owners. That is called "throwing
the bun to the bears." The State then knows its total commitments, is
not involved in interminable arbitrations, and can get on with what lies
ahead at once, leaving the claimants to fight out the compensation
amongst themselves. This does not mean that the State will have to find
551/2 millions sterling in cash. It means this, in the words of Sir
Richard Redmayne: "The State would in effect say to each owner of a
mineral tract: The value of your property to a purchaser is in present
money £x, and you are required to lend to the State the amount of this