made clear to ourselves what exactly we meant by it, and in the absence
of explanations it was interpreted in Egypt as a first step to the
extinction of Egyptian nationality.


AFTER-WAR MISTAKES

Had we acted wisely and expeditiously at the end of the war we might
even then have avoided the trouble that followed. But when Egyptian
ministers asked leave to come to London in December, 1918, we answered
that the time was not opportune for these discussions, and when the
Nationalist leaders proposed to send a delegation, we said that no good
purpose could be served by their coming to Europe. This heightened the
alarm, and the Nationalists retorted by raising their claims from
"complete autonomy" to "complete independence," and started a violent
agitation. The Government retaliated by deporting Zaghlul to Malta,
whereupon the country broke into rebellion. Lord Allenby now came upon
the scene, and, while suppressing the rebellion, released Zaghlul and
gave him and his delegation the permission to go to Europe which had
been refused in January. It was now decided to send out the Milner
Mission, but there was a further delay of seven months before it
started, and during all that time agitation continued.

When the Mission arrived it quickly discovered that there was no
possible "Constitution under the Protectorate" which would satisfy the
Egyptians, and that the sole alternatives were further suppression or
the discovery of some means of settlement which dispensed with the
Protectorate. The Mission unanimously came to the conclusion that though
the first was mechanically possible if the cost and discredit were
faced, the second was not only feasible but far preferable, and that the