time too exclusively paid to frontier policy, which constitutes only
one, and that not the most important, element of the complex Indian
problem.

That the policy of "masterly inactivity," to use the phrase
epigrammatically, but perhaps somewhat incorrectly, applied to the line
of action advocated by Lord Lawrence in 1869, required some
modifications as the onward movement of Russia in Asia developed, will
scarcely be contested by the most devoted of Lawrentian partisans and
followers. That those modifications were wisely introduced is a
proposition the truth of which it is difficult to admit. The portion of
Lord Lawrence's programme which was necessarily temporary, inasmuch as
it depended on the circumstances of the time, was rejected without
taking sufficient account of the further and far more important portion
which was of permanent application. This latter portion was defined in
an historic and oft-quoted despatch which he indited on the eve of his
departure from India, and which may be regarded as his political
testament. In this despatch, Lord Lawrence, speaking with all the
authority due to a lifelong acquaintance with Indian affairs, laid down
the broad general principle that the strongest security of our rule lay
"in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses."[22] The
truth of this general principle was at one time too much neglected.
Under the influence of a predominant militarism acting on too pliant
politicians, vast military expenditure was incurred. Territory lying
outside the natural geographical frontier of India was occupied, the
acquisition of which was condemned not merely by sound policy, but also
by sound strategy. Taxation was increased, and, generally, the material
interests of the natives of India were sacrificed and British Imperial
rule exposed to subsequent danger, in order to satisfy the exigencies of
a school of soldier-politicians who only saw one, and that the most