the security of the Pharaoh.* It was never part of the policy of Egypt
to insist on her foreign subjects keeping an unbroken peace among
themselves. If, theoretically, she did not recognise the right of
private warfare, she at all events tolerated its practice. It mattered
little to her whether some particular province passed out of the
possession of a certain Eibaddû into that of a certain Azîru, or _vice
versa_, so long as both Eibaddû and Azîru remained her faithful slaves.
She never sought to repress their incessant quarrelling until such time
as it threatened to take the form of an insurrection against her own
power. Then alone did she throw off her neutrality; taking the side of
one or other of the dissentients, she would grant him, as a pledge of
help, ten, twenty, thirty, or even more archers.**

* A half at least of the Tel el-Amarna correspondence treats
of provincial wars between the kings of towns and countries
subject to Egypt--wars of Abdashirti and his son Azîru
against the cities of the Phoenician coast, wars of
Abdikhiba, or Abdi-Tabba, King of Jerusalem, against the
chiefs of the neighbouring cities.

** Abimilki (Abisharri) demands on one occasion from the
King of Egypt ten men to defend Tyre, on another occasion
twenty; the town of Gula requisitioned thirty or forty to
guard it. Delattre thinks that these are rhetorical
expressions answering to a general word, just as if we
should say "a handful of men"; the difference of value in
the figures is to me a proof of their reality.

No doubt the discipline and personal courage of these veterans exercised
a certain influence on the turn of events, but they were after all a