in the detection of conceit. I do not however think that we have yet found
the Sophist, or that his will ultimately prove to be the desired art of
education; but neither do I think that he can long escape me, for every way
is blocked. Before we make the final assault, let us take breath, and
reckon up the many forms which he has assumed: (1) he was the paid hunter
of wealth and birth; (2) he was the trader in the goods of the soul; (3) he
was the retailer of them; (4) he was the manufacturer of his own learned
wares; (5) he was the disputant; and (6) he was the purger away of
prejudices--although this latter point is admitted to be doubtful.

Now, there must surely be something wrong in the professor of any art
having so many names and kinds of knowledge. Does not the very number of
them imply that the nature of his art is not understood? And that we may
not be involved in the misunderstanding, let us observe which of his
characteristics is the most prominent. Above all things he is a disputant.
He will dispute and teach others to dispute about things visible and
invisible--about man, about the gods, about politics, about law, about
wrestling, about all things. But can he know all things? 'He cannot.'
How then can he dispute satisfactorily with any one who knows?
'Impossible.' Then what is the trick of his art, and why does he receive
money from his admirers? 'Because he is believed by them to know all
things.' You mean to say that he seems to have a knowledge of them?
'Yes.'

Suppose a person were to say, not that he would dispute about all things,
but that he would make all things, you and me, and all other creatures, the
earth and the heavens and the gods, and would sell them all for a few
pence--this would be a great jest; but not greater than if he said that he
knew all things, and could teach them in a short time, and at a small cost.
For all imitation is a jest, and the most graceful form of jest. Now the