that to which I deny both plurality and unity? You, Theaetetus, have the
might of youth, and I conjure you to exert yourself, and, if you can, to
find an expression for not-being which does not imply being and number.
'But I cannot.' Then the Sophist must be left in his hole. We may call
him an image-maker if we please, but he will only say, 'And pray, what is
an image?' And we shall reply, 'A reflection in the water, or in a
mirror'; and he will say, 'Let us shut our eyes and open our minds; what is
the common notion of all images?' 'I should answer, Such another, made in
the likeness of the true.' Real or not real? 'Not real; at least, not in
a true sense.' And the real 'is,' and the not-real 'is not'? 'Yes.' Then
a likeness is really unreal, and essentially not. Here is a pretty
complication of being and not-being, in which the many-headed Sophist has
entangled us. He will at once point out that he is compelling us to
contradict ourselves, by affirming being of not-being. I think that we
must cease to look for him in the class of imitators.

But ought we to give him up? 'I should say, certainly not.' Then I fear
that I must lay hands on my father Parmenides; but do not call me a
parricide; for there is no way out of the difficulty except to show that in
some sense not-being is; and if this is not admitted, no one can speak of
falsehood, or false opinion, or imitation, without falling into a
contradiction. You observe how unwilling I am to undertake the task; for I
know that I am exposing myself to the charge of inconsistency in asserting
the being of not-being. But if I am to make the attempt, I think that I
had better begin at the beginning.

Lightly in the days of our youth, Parmenides and others told us tales about
the origin of the universe: one spoke of three principles warring and at
peace again, marrying and begetting children; another of two principles,
hot and cold, dry and moist, which also formed relationships. There were