philosophy appear. Many terms which were used absolutely in the beginning
of philosophy, such as 'Being,' 'matter,' 'cause,' and the like, became
relative in the subsequent history of thought. But Hegel employs some of
them absolutely, some relatively, seemingly without any principle and
without any regard to their original significance.

The divisions of the Hegelian logic bear a superficial resemblance to the
divisions of the scholastic logic. The first part answers to the term, the
second to the proposition, the third to the syllogism. These are the
grades of thought under which we conceive the world, first, in the general
terms of quality, quantity, measure; secondly, under the relative forms of
'ground' and existence, substance and accidents, and the like; thirdly in
syllogistic forms of the individual mediated with the universal by the help
of the particular. Of syllogisms there are various kinds,--qualitative,
quantitative, inductive, mechanical, teleological,--which are developed out
of one another. But is there any meaning in reintroducing the forms of the
old logic? Who ever thinks of the world as a syllogism? What connexion is
there between the proposition and our ideas of reciprocity, cause and
effect, and similar relations? It is difficult enough to conceive all the
powers of nature and mind gathered up in one. The difficulty is greatly
increased when the new is confused with the old, and the common logic is
the Procrustes' bed into which they are forced.

The Hegelian philosophy claims, as we have seen, to be based upon
experience: it abrogates the distinction of a priori and a posteriori
truth. It also acknowledges that many differences of kind are resolvable
into differences of degree. It is familiar with the terms 'evolution,'
'development,' and the like. Yet it can hardly be said to have considered
the forms of thought which are best adapted for the expression of facts.
It has never applied the categories to experience; it has not defined the