language of the common people, so Hegel seems to have thought that he gave
his philosophy a truly German character by the use of idiomatic German
words. But it may be doubted whether the attempt has been successful.
First because such words as 'in sich seyn,' 'an sich seyn,' 'an und fur
sich seyn,' though the simplest combinations of nouns and verbs, require a
difficult and elaborate explanation. The simplicity of the words contrasts
with the hardness of their meaning. Secondly, the use of technical
phraseology necessarily separates philosophy from general literature; the
student has to learn a new language of uncertain meaning which he with
difficulty remembers. No former philosopher had ever carried the use of
technical terms to the same extent as Hegel. The language of Plato or even
of Aristotle is but slightly removed from that of common life, and was
introduced naturally by a series of thinkers: the language of the
scholastic logic has become technical to us, but in the Middle Ages was the
vernacular Latin of priests and students. The higher spirit of philosophy,
the spirit of Plato and Socrates, rebels against the Hegelian use of
language as mechanical and technical.

Hegel is fond of etymologies and often seems to trifle with words. He
gives etymologies which are bad, and never considers that the meaning of a
word may have nothing to do with its derivation. He lived before the days
of Comparative Philology or of Comparative Mythology and Religion, which
would have opened a new world to him. He makes no allowance for the
element of chance either in language or thought; and perhaps there is no
greater defect in his system than the want of a sound theory of language.
He speaks as if thought, instead of being identical with language, was
wholly independent of it. It is not the actual growth of the mind, but the
imaginary growth of the Hegelian system, which is attractive to him.

Neither are we able to say why of the common forms of thought some are