workmen. One was told, over and over again, that the first step in
improvement would be the obtaining of spare parts for locomotives. It
seems strange that these could not be manufactured in Russia. To some
extent they can be, and we were shown locomotives which had been
repaired on Communist Saturdays. But in the main the machinery for
making spare parts is lacking and the skill required for its
manufacture does not exist. Thus dependence on the outside world
persists, and the blockade continues to do its deadly work of
spreading hunger, demoralization and despair.

The food question is intimately bound up with the question of
industry. There is a vicious circle, for not only does the absence of
manufactured goods cause a food shortage in the towns, but the food
shortage, in turn, diminishes the strength of the workers and makes
them less able to produce goods. I cannot but think that there has
been some mismanagement as regards the food question. For example, in
Petrograd many workers have allotments and often work in them for
eight hours after an eight hours' day in their regular employment. But
the food produced in the allotments is taken for general consumption,
not left to each individual producer. This is in accordance with
Communist theory, but of course greatly diminishes the incentive to
work, and increases the red tape and administrative machinery.

Lack of fuel has been another very grave source of trouble. Before the
war coal came mostly from Poland and the Donetz Basin. Poland is lost
to Russia, and the Donetz Basin was in the hands of Denikin, who so
destroyed the mines before retreating that they are still not in
working order. The result is a practically complete absence of coal.
Oil, which is equally important in Russia, was also lacking until the
recent recovery of Baku. All that I saw on the Volga made me believe