revolutionary Communism would leave the capitalists no money with
which to attempt corruption. This has been achieved in Russia, and
could be achieved elsewhere. But selling oneself to the capitalists
is not the only possible form of treachery. It is also possible,
having acquired power, to use it for one's own ends instead of for the
people. This is what I believe to be likely to happen in Russia: the
establishment of a bureaucratic aristocracy, concentrating authority
in its own hands, and creating a régime just as oppressive and cruel
as that of capitalism. Marxians never sufficiently recognize that love
of power is quite as strong a motive, and quite as great a source of
injustice, as love of money; yet this must be obvious to any unbiased
student of politics. It is also obvious that the method of violent
revolution leading to a minority dictatorship is one peculiarly
calculated to create habits of despotism which would survive the
crisis by which they were generated. Communist politicians are likely
to become just like the politicians of other parties: a few will be
honest, but the great majority will merely cultivate the art of
telling a plausible tale with a view to tricking the people into
entrusting them with power. The only possible way by which politicians
as a class can be improved is the political and psychological
education of the people, so that they may learn to detect a humbug. In
England men have reached the point of suspecting a good speaker, but
if a man speaks badly they think he must be honest. Unfortunately,
virtue is not so widely diffused as this theory would imply.

In the second place, it is assumed by the Communist argument that,
although capitalist propaganda can prevent the majority from becoming
Communists, yet capitalist laws and police forces cannot prevent the
Communists, while still a minority, from acquiring a supremacy of
military power. It is thought that secret propaganda can undermine the