nicht leben und nicht sterben lässt."[2] And yet Hartmann himself does
not hesitate to admit that this very condition of individual
Weltschmerz, or "Zerrissenheit," is a necessary and inevitable stage in
the progress of the mind toward that clarified universal Weltschmerz
which is based upon theoretical insight, namely pessimism in its most
logical sense. This being granted, we shall not be far astray in
assuming that it is also the stage to which the philosophic pessimist
will sometimes revert, when a strong sense of his own individuality
asserts itself.

If we attempt a classification of Weltschmerz with regard to its
essence, or, better perhaps, with regard to its origin, we shall find
that the various types may be classed under one of two heads: either as
cosmic or as egoistic. The representatives of cosmic Weltschmerz are
those poets whose first concern is not their personal fate, their own
unhappiness, it may be, but who see first and foremost the sad fate of
humanity and regard their own misfortunes merely as a part of the common
destiny. The representatives of the second type are those introspective
natures who are first and chiefly aware of their own misery and finally
come to regard it as representative of universal evil. The former
proceed from the general to the particular, the latter from the
particular to the general. But that these types must necessarily be
entirely distinct in all cases, as Marchand[3] asserts, seems open to
serious doubt. It is inconceivable that a poet into whose personal
experience no shadows have fallen should take the woes of humanity very
deeply to heart; nor again could we imagine that one who has brooded
over the unhappy condition of mankind in general should never give
expression to a note of personal sorrow. It is in the complexity of
motives in one and the same subject that the difficulty lies in making
rigid and sharp distinctions. In some cases Weltschmerz may arise from