commanded by him should as quickly as possible pass out of his control
into that of an official who could render it more efficient than he. And
under the existing system this, as we have seen already, is precisely
what sooner or later would be brought about automatically. The
inefficient director, in proportion to his relative inefficiency, loses
his customers, and can direct labour no longer, or is obliged to direct
it on a very much reduced scale. But if each director of labour owed, as
he would do under socialism, his means of directing it, not to the
results of his individual efficiency, but to a single common
source--namely, to the collective capital of the country or the forcible
authority of the law--there is nothing in the fact that one constructor
of ships wastes labour in constructing them which another constructor
would have saved, to prevent him from continuing in his post, or even to
insure that he will vacate it in favour of an abler man, whether an
official rival or otherwise, as soon as such a man is available.

There is also this further fact to be noted. Although we are assuming
that the socialistic directors of labour will exert their talents to the
utmost without requiring the stimulus of a proportionate reward in
money, we must necessarily assume that they will value their posts for
some reason or other just as much as they would do were the largest
emoluments attached to them. Consequently we may, condescending to
vulgar language, say, as a certainty, that they will do their very best
to stick to them. All these official persons, as contrasted with the
labouring public, will occupy positions of similar and desirable
privilege; and while their latent rivalry among themselves will be
hampered in the manner just indicated, they will none of them be
inclined to welcome any further rivalry from without. If the least
efficient of our two naval constructors could not be forced by the fact
of his relative inefficiency to hand over all or any portion of his