or negation, but only the removal of limit or restraint, which we suppose
to exist not before but after we have already set bounds to thought and
matter, and divided them after their kinds. From different points of view,
either the finite or infinite may be looked upon respectively both as
positive and negative (compare 'Omnis determinatio est negatio')' and the
conception of the one determines that of the other. The Greeks and the
moderns seem to be nearly at the opposite poles in their manner of
regarding them. And both are surprised when they make the discovery, as
Plato has done in the Sophist, how large an element negation forms in the
framework of their thoughts.

2, 3. The finite element which mingles with and regulates the infinite is
best expressed to us by the word 'law.' It is that which measures all
things and assigns to them their limit; which preserves them in their
natural state, and brings them within the sphere of human cognition. This
is described by the terms harmony, health, order, perfection, and the like.
All things, in as far as they are good, even pleasures, which are for the
most part indefinite, partake of this element. We should be wrong in
attributing to Plato the conception of laws of nature derived from
observation and experiment. And yet he has as intense a conviction as any
modern philosopher that nature does not proceed by chance. But observing
that the wonderful construction of number and figure, which he had within
himself, and which seemed to be prior to himself, explained a part of the
phenomena of the external world, he extended their principles to the whole,
finding in them the true type both of human life and of the order of
nature.

Two other points may be noticed respecting the third class. First, that
Plato seems to be unconscious of any interval or chasm which separates the
finite from the infinite. The one is in various ways and degrees working