any reconciliation or even remark, in the Republic he speaks at one time of
God or Gods, and at another time of the Good. So in the Phaedrus he seems
to pass unconsciously from the concrete to the abstract conception of the
Ideas in the same dialogue. Nor in the Philebus is he careful to show in
what relation the idea of the divine mind stands to the supreme principle
of measure.

b. Again, to us there is a strongly-marked distinction between a first
cause and a final cause. And we should commonly identify a first cause
with God, and the final cause with the world, which is His work. But
Plato, though not a Pantheist, and very far from confounding God with the
world, tends to identify the first with the final cause. The cause of the
union of the finite and infinite might be described as a higher law; the
final measure which is the highest expression of the good may also be
described as the supreme law. Both these conceptions are realized chiefly
by the help of the material world; and therefore when we pass into the
sphere of ideas can hardly be distinguished.

The four principles are required for the determination of the relative
places of pleasure and wisdom. Plato has been saying that we should
proceed by regular steps from the one to the many. Accordingly, before
assigning the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first find out
and arrange in order the general principles of things. Mind is ascertained
to be akin to the nature of the cause, while pleasure is found in the
infinite or indefinite class. We may now proceed to divide pleasure and
knowledge after their kinds.

III. 1. Plato speaks of pleasure as indefinite, as relative, as a
generation, and in all these points of view as in a category distinct from
good. For again we must repeat, that to the Greek 'the good is of the