further question, and admitting, as we must, the possibility of such a
state, there seems to be no reason why the life of wisdom should not exist
in this neutral state, which is, moreover, the state of the gods, who
cannot, without indecency, be supposed to feel either joy or sorrow.

The second class of pleasures involves memory. There are affections which
are extinguished before they reach the soul, and of these there is no
consciousness, and therefore no memory. And there are affections which the
body and soul feel together, and this feeling is termed consciousness. And
memory is the preservation of consciousness, and reminiscence is the
recovery of consciousness. Now the memory of pleasure, when a man is in
pain, is the memory of the opposite of his actual bodily state, and is
therefore not in the body, but in the mind. And there may be an
intermediate state, in which a person is balanced between pleasure and
pain; in his body there is want which is a cause of pain, but in his mind a
sure hope of replenishment, which is pleasant. (But if the hope be
converted into despair, he has two pains and not a balance of pain and
pleasure.) Another question is raised: May not pleasures, like opinions,
be true and false? In the sense of being real, both must be admitted to be
true: nor can we deny that to both of them qualities may be attributed;
for pleasures as well as opinions may be described as good or bad. And
though we do not all of us allow that there are true and false pleasures,
we all acknowledge that there are some pleasures associated with right
opinion, and others with falsehood and ignorance. Let us endeavour to
analyze the nature of this association.

Opinion is based on perception, which may be correct or mistaken. You may
see a figure at a distance, and say first of all, 'This is a man,' and then
say, 'No, this is an image made by the shepherds.' And you may affirm this
in a proposition to your companion, or make the remark mentally to