the other for mental facts--any thinker maintaining the separate mental
substance to be unproved, and unnecessary, is denounced as trying to
blot out our mental existence, and to resolve us into watches,
steam-engines, or speaking and calculating machines. The upholder of the
single substance has to spend himself in protestations that he is not
denying the existence of the fact, or the phenomena called mind, but is
merely challenging an arbitrary and unfounded hypothesis for
representing that fact.

[PERCEPTION OF A MATERIAL WORLD.]

The still greater controversy--distinct from the foregoing, although
often confounded with it--relating to the Perception of a Material
World, is the crowning instance of the weakness we are considering.
Berkeley has been unceasingly stigmatised as holding that there is no
material world, merely because he exposed a self-contradiction in the
mode of viewing it, common to the vulgar and to philosophers, and
suggested a mode of escaping the contradiction by an altered rendering
of the facts. The case is very peculiar. The received and
self-contradictory view is exceedingly simple and intelligible in its
statement; it is well adapted, not merely for all the commoner purposes
of life, but even for most scientific purposes. The supposition of an
independent material world, and an independent mental world, created
apart, and coming into mutual contact--the one the objects perceived,
and the other the mind perceiving--expresses (or over-expresses) the
division of the sciences into sciences of matter and sciences of mind;
and the highest laws of the material world at least are in no respect
falsified by it. On the other hand, any attempt to state the facts of
the outer world on Berkeley's plan, or on any plan that avoids the
self-contradiction, is most cumbrous and unmanageable. A smaller, but