In the Spanish War the friction between the United States and Spain
was altogether about Cuba. No serious thought of the invasion of
either country was entertained, no invasion was attempted, and
the only land engagements were some minor engagements in Cuba and
the Philippines. The critical operations were purely naval. In the
first of these, Commodore Dewey's squadron destroyed the entire
Far Eastern squadron of the Spanish in Manila Bay; in the second,
Admiral Sampson's squadron destroyed the entire Atlantic squadron of
the Spanish near Santiago de Cuba. The two naval victories compelled
Spain to make terms of peace practically as the United States wished.
Attention is invited to the fact that this war was not a war of
conquest, was not a war of aggression, was not a war of invasion,
was not a war carried on by either side for any base purpose; but
was in its intention and its results for the benefit of mankind.

The Russo-Japanese War was due to conflicting national policies.
While each side accused the other of selfish ends, it is not apparent
to a disinterested observer that either was unduly selfish in its
policy, or was doing more than every country ought to advance the
interests and promote the welfare of its people. Russia naturally
had a great deal of interest in Manchuria, and felt that she had
a right to expand through the uncivilized regions of Manchuria,
especially since she needed a satisfactory outlet to the sea. In
other words, the interests of Russia were in the line of its expanding
to the eastward. But Japan's interests were precisely the reverse of
Russia's--that is, Japan's interests demanded that Russia should not
do those things that Russia wanted to do. Japan felt that Russia's
movement toward the East was bringing her entirely too close to
Japan. Russia was too powerful a country, and too aggressive, to
be trusted so close. Japan had the same feeling toward Russia that