to enter the conference with as large a navy as possible.

Therefore, the probability of an approaching agreement among the
nations as to limitation of armaments, instead of being a reason
for abating our exertions toward establishing a powerful navy,
is really a conclusive reason for redoubling them.

This brings us to the important question, "how powerful should our
navy be?"

This may seem a question impossible to answer. Of course it is
impossible to answer it in terms of ships and guns; but an approximate
estimate may be reached by considering the case of a man playing
poker who holds a royal straight flush. Such a man would be a fool
if he did not back his hand to the limit and get all the benefit
possible from it. So will the United States, if she fails to back
her hand to the limit, recognizing the fact that in the grand game
now going on for the stakes of the commercial supremacy of the world,
she holds the best hand. She has the largest and most numerous
seaports, the most enterprising and inventive people, and the most
wealth with which to force to success all the various necessary
undertakings.

This does not mean that the United States ought, as a matter either
of ethics or of policy, to build a great navy in order to take
unjust advantage of weaker nations; but it does mean that she ought
to build a navy great enough to save her from being shorn of her
wealth and glory by simple force, as France was shorn in 1871.

It is often said that the reason for Great Britain's having so