account of this we may to a certain extent discount the danger of
attack and the preparedness required to meet it. But our discount
should be reasonable and reasoned out, and certainly not excessive.
Fortunately the problem of how much time we should allow for mobilizing
and joining the fleet is easy, as a moment's thought will show us
that it must be simply the two weeks needed for a fleet to come
from Europe to America; for we must realize that the report of the
sailing of the hostile fleet would be the first news we should
get of any hostile preparation or intent.

The general situation in which every isolated naval nation stands
regarding other nations is not complicated, but very plain. Each
nation has, as possible opponents in its policy, certain countries.
The naval forces of those countries and the time in which they can
be made ready are known with sufficient accuracy for practical
purposes. If any isolated naval nation wishes to carry out a policy
which any of those countries will forcibly oppose she must either
build a navy equal to that of the other country, or else be prepared
to abandon any attempt to force her policies. Stating the question
in another way, she can carry out only such policies as do not
require for their enforcement a navy stronger than she has.

It is true that diplomacy and the jealousies of foreign powers
unite to make possible the averting of war during long periods of
time. Diplomacy averted war with Germany for forty-three years, but
it could not continue to avert war eternally. War finally broke out
with a violence unparalleled in history, and possessing a magnitude
proportional to the duration of the preceding peace. "Long coming long
last, short notice soon past" is a sailor's maxim about storms; and
it seems not inapplicable to wars. Certain it is that the frequent