Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism by Mary Mills Patrick
page 32 of 196 (16%)
page 32 of 196 (16%)
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Aenesidemus. The comprehensive title [Greek: PurrhĂ´neioi
hupotupĂ´seis] was very probably used in general to designate courses of lectures given by the leaders of the Sceptical School. In the opening chapters of the _Hypotyposes_ Sextus undertakes to define the position and aim of Pyrrhonism.[2] In introducing his subject he treats briefly of the differences between philosophical schools, dividing them into three classes; those which claim that they have found the truth, like the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics; those which deny the possibility of finding it, like that of the Academicians; and those that still seek it, like the Sceptical School. The accusation against the Academicians, that they denied the possibility of finding the truth, was one that the Sceptics were very fond of making. We shall discuss the justice of it later, simply remarking here, that to affirm the "incomprehensibility of the unknown," was a form of expression that the Pyrrhonists themselves were sometimes betrayed into, notwithstanding their careful avoidance of dogmatic statements.[3] [1] Diog. IX. 11, 78. [2] _Hyp._ I. 3, 4. [3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 191. After defining the three kinds of philosophy as the Dogmatic, the Academic and the Sceptic, Sextus reminds his hearers that he does not speak dogmatically in anything that he says, but that |
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