such as "Nothing more,"[7] or "I decide nothing,"[8] or "All is
false," include themselves with other things. The only
statements that the Sceptic can make, are in regard to his own
sensations. He cannot deny that he is warm or cold or hungry.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 15, 17.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 210.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 7; Diog. IX. 11, 70.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 8.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 10.

[6] _Hyp._ I. 12.

[7] _Hyp._ I. 14.

[8] _Hyp._ I. 14.

Sextus replies to the charge that the Sceptics deny phenomena by
refuting it.[1] The Sceptic does not deny phenomena, because
they are the only criteria by which he can regulate his actions.
"We call the criterion of the Sceptical School the phenomenon,
meaning by this name the idea of it."[2] Phenomena are the only
things which the Sceptic does not deny, and he guides his life
by them. They are, however, subjective. Sextus distinctly
affirms that sensations are the phenomena,[3] and that they lie
in susceptibility and voluntary feeling, and that they