Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism by Mary Mills Patrick
page 37 of 196 (18%)
page 37 of 196 (18%)
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[5] _Hyp._ I. 23. [6] _Hyp._ I. 24. The aim of Pyrrhonism was ataraxia in those things which pertain to opinion, and moderation in the things which life imposes.[1] In other words, we find here the same natural desire of the human being to rise above and beyond the limitations which pain and passion impose, which is expressed in other forms, and under other names, in other schools of philosophy. The method, however, by which ataraxia or peace of mind could be reached, was peculiar to the Sceptic. It is a state of psychological equilibrium, which results from the equality of the weight of different arguments that are opposed to each other, and the consequent impossibility of affirming in regard to either one, that it is correct.[2] The discovery of ataraxia was, in the first instance, apparently accidental, for while the Sceptic withheld his opinion, unable to decide what things were true, and what things were false, ataraxia fortunately followed.[3] After he had begun to philosophize, with a desire to discriminate in regard to ideas, and to separate the true from the false[4] during the time of [Greek: epochĂȘ], or suspension of judgement, ataraxia followed as if by chance, as the shadow follows the body.[5] [1] _Hyp._ I. 25. [2] _Hyp._ I. 26. |
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