Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism by Mary Mills Patrick
page 40 of 196 (20%)
page 40 of 196 (20%)
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maintained.[2] Although ataraxia concerns things of the opinion,
and must be preceded by the intellectual process described above, it is not itself a function of the intellect, or any subtle kind of reasoning, but seems to be rather a unique form of moral perfection, leading to happiness, or is itself happiness. [1] _Hyp._ I. 28, 29. [2] _Hyp._ I. 32-35. It was the aim of Scepticism to know nothing, and to assert nothing in regard to any subject, but at the same time not to affirm that knowledge on all subjects is impossible, and consequently to have the attitude of still seeking. The standpoint of Pyrrhonism was materialistic. We find from the teachings of Sextus that he affirmed the non-existence of the soul,[1] or the ego, and denied absolute existence altogether.[2] The introductory statements of Diogenes regarding Pyrrhonism would agree with this standpoint.[3] There is no criterion of truth in Scepticism. We cannot prove that the phenomena represent objects, or find out what the relation of phenomena to objects is. There is no criterion to tell us which one is true of all the different representations of the same object, and of all the varieties of sensation that arise through the many phases of relativity of the conditions which control the character of the phenomena. Every effort to find the truth can deal only with phenomena, and |
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