Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism by Mary Mills Patrick
page 45 of 196 (22%)
page 45 of 196 (22%)
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expressions in both Diogenes' and Sextus' exposition of the
Tropes, which could not date back farther than the time of Aenesidemus.[1] One of the most striking features of the whole presentation of the Tropes, especially as given by Sextus, is their mosaic character, stamping them not as the work of one person, but as a growth, and also an agglutinous growth, lacking very decidedly the symmetry of thought that the work of one mind would have shown. [1] Zeller _Op. cit._ p. 25. At the time of the separation of Pyrrhonism from the Academy, no other force was as strong in giving life to the school as the systematic treatment by Aenesidemus of the Ten Tropes of [Greek: epochĂȘ]. The reason of this is evident. It was not that the ideas of the Sceptical Tropes were original with Aenesidemus, but because a definite statement of belief is always a far more powerful influence than principles which are vaguely understood and accepted. There is always, however, the danger to the Sceptic, in making a statement even of the principles of Scepticism, that the psychological result would be a dogmatic tendency of mind, as we shall see later was the case, even with Aenesidemus himself. That the Sceptical School could not escape the accusation of dogmatizing, from the Dogmatics, even in stating the grounds of their Scepticism, we know from Diogenes.[1] To avoid this dogmatic tendency of the ten Tropes, Sextus makes the frequent assertion that he does not affirm things to be absolutely true, but states them as they appear to him, and that they may be otherwise from what he has said.[2] |
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