Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism by Mary Mills Patrick
page 8 of 196 (04%)
page 8 of 196 (04%)
|
While, however, some of the pages of Sextus' works would form a
possible introduction to certain lines of modern philosophical thought, we cannot carry the analogy farther, for Pyrrhonism as a whole lacked the essential element of all philosophical progress, which is a belief in the possibility of finding and establishing the truth in the subjects investigated. Before beginning a critical study of the writings of Sextus Empiricus, and the light which they throw on the development of Greek Scepticism, it is necessary to make ourselves somewhat familiar with the environment in which he lived and wrote. We shall thus be able to comprehend more fully the standpoint from which he regarded philosophical questions. Let us accordingly attempt to give some details of his life, including his profession, the time when he lived, the place of his birth, the country in which he taught, and the general aim and character of his works. Here, however, we encounter great difficulties, for although we possess most of the writings of Sextus well preserved, the evidence which they provide on the points mentioned is very slight. He does not give us biographical details in regard to himself, nor does he refer to his contemporaries in a way to afford any exact knowledge of them. His name even furnishes us with a problem impossible of solution. He is called [Greek: Sextos ho empeirikos] by Diogenes Laertius[1]: [Greek: Hêrodotou de diêkouse Sextos ho empeirikos hou kai ta deka tôn skeptikôn kai alla kallista' Sextou de diêkouse Satorninos ho Kythênas, empeirikos kai autos]. Although in this passage Diogenes speaks of Sextus the second time without the surname, we cannot understand the meaning otherwise |
|