resume his central position at Verona, from which he could, according to
circumstances, march with convenience on whatever line the Austrian main
body might choose for their advance.

The Imperialists, as if determined to profit by no lesson, once more
descended from the Tyrol upon two different lines of march; Alvinzi
himself choosing that of the Upper Adige; while Provera headed a second
army, with orders to follow the Brenta, and then, striking across to the
Lower Adige, join the marshal before the walls of Mantua. Could they
have combined their forces there, and delivered Wurmser, there was
hardly a doubt that the French must retreat before so vast an army as
would then have faced them. But Napoleon was destined once more to
dissipate all these victorious dreams. He had posted Joubert at Rivoli,
to dispute that important position, should the campaign open with an
attempt to force it by Alvinzi; while Augereau's division was to watch
the march of Provera. He remained himself at Verona until he could learn
with certainty by which of these generals the first grand assault was to
be made. On the evening of the 13th of January, tidings were brought him
that Joubert had all that day been maintaining his ground with
difficulty; and he instantly hastened to what now appeared to be the
proper scene of action for himself.

Arriving about two in the morning (by another of his almost incredible
forced marches) on the heights of Rivoli, he, the moonlight being clear,
could distinguish five separate encampments, with innumerable
watch-fires, in the valley below. His lieutenant, confounded by the
display of this gigantic force, was in the very act of abandoning the
position. Napoleon instantly checked this movement; and bringing up more
battalions, forced the Croats from an eminence which they had already
seized on the first symptoms of the French retreat. Napoleon's keen eye,