unfortunately hung up and prevented our reaping quite the full fruits.
This was partly due to a raid on our L. of C. scuppering some
barge-loads of fuel, but chiefly to the boats getting stuck on mud
banks. This river is devilish hard to navigate just now. It winds like a
corkscrew, and though it looks 150 yards wide, the navigable channel is
quite narrow, and only 4ft. to 6ft. deep at that. So all the river boats
have to be flat bottomed, and the strong current and violent N.W. wind
keeps pushing them on the mud banks at every bend.

[Illustration]

The Turks had, they think, 15,000 men and 32 guns. Their position was
twelve miles long and most elaborately entrenched and wired with all
the German devices, and rested on a marsh at either end.

We had about 10,000 men of all arms and 25 or 27 guns, seven of them
on river boats, I think. Townshend's attack was as follows. He made
all his reconnaissances and preparations as for an attack on their
right flank, and on Monday, 27th he deployed a brigade, A. on that
side of the river, leaving only two battalions, B. on the right bank,
and keeping two battalions in reserve, C. For various reasons this
attack had made very little progress by sunset and was last seen
digging itself in. Then as soon as it got dark almost the whole of A.
together with the reserve C. was ordered to march round to the enemy's
left flank and attack Fort E. at dawn. So they moved off, intending to
go between Marsh 1 and Marsh 2; but in the dark they went round
outside Marsh 2, and at dawn after a twelve mile march found
themselves at G. They completely surprised and quickly captured Fort
E. and the section E. and F., their casualties here being mainly from
our own artillery, as was inevitable: but they were enfiladed from F.