Obj. 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But
with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple;
thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals
than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God
is altogether simple.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and
absolutely simple."

_I answer that,_ The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many
ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is
neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a
body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ
from His _suppositum_; nor His essence from His existence; neither is
there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and
accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is
altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to
its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first
being, as shown above (Q. 2, A. 3). Thirdly, because every
composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite
unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown
above (Q. 2, A. 3), since He is the first efficient cause.
Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and
actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts
actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the
whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any
single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of
dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts
of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although