Obj. 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there
is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it
is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided
against the pleasant and the virtuous.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De
Offic. i, 9)

_I answer that,_ This division properly concerns human goodness. But if
we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal
point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns
goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable,
and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose
movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural
body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end
absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the
end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of
movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the
ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the
thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state
of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the
thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively,
as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the
useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating
the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own
sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is
that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the
movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is
called the pleasant.