Council to take away any of its acts from the public control."

Another defect in the optional Referendum is that it can be transformed
into a partisan weapon--politicians being ready, in Geneva, as in San
Francisco, to take advantage of the law for party purposes. For example,
the representatives of a minority party, seeking a concession from a
majority which has just passed a bill, will threaten, if their demands
are not granted, to agitate for the Referendum on the bill; this, though
the minority itself may favor the measure, some of its members, perhaps,
having voted for it. As the majority may be uncertain of the outcome of
a struggle at the polls, it will probably be inclined to make peace on
the terms dictated by the minority.

But the most serious objections to the optional form arise in connection
with the petitioning. Easy though it be for a rich and strong party to
bear the expense of printing, mailing, and distributing petitions and
circulars, in case of opposition from the poorer classes the cost may
prove an insurmountable obstacle. Especially is it difficult to get up a
petition after several successive appeals coming close together, the
constant agitation growing tiresome as well as financially burdensome.
Hence, measures have sometimes become law simply because the people have
not had time to recover from the prolonged agitation in connection with
preceding propositions. Besides, each measure submitted to the optional
Referendum brings with it two separate waves of popular discussion--one
on the petition and one on the subsequent vote. On this point
ex-President Numa Droz has said: "The agitation which takes place while
collecting the necessary signatures, nearly always attended with strong
feeling, diverts the mind from the object of the law, perverts in
advance public opinion, and, not permitting later the calm discussion of
the measure proposed, establishes an almost irresistible current toward