undertaking. Guns without ammunition are useless. To get shells on to
the kopje without disaster was an infinitely more difficult
undertaking. He solved it by installing a hill lift. The veldt is not
a very promising engineering shop; but Butcher was not easily beaten.
Using steel rails for standards and anything worthy the name for
cable, he soon had the framework erected. To the uprights were fixed
snatchblocks over which he passed his carrying wires. On this mountain
lift he was able to send weights up to 30 lbs., thanks to an ingenious
system of pulleys. Nor was the lift altogether rustic, for a drum and
ratchet made it double-acting, so that as one load went up another was
automatically let down. It is only fair to say that the Boers
themselves were masters of the art of haulage. How they managed to get
their guns to the top of kopjes remained for long a mystery to our
men. Butcher, however, quickly taught his men to beat the enemy at
their own game, although nothing else quite so dramatic as the Coles
Kop incident is on record.

During this proceeding French had been distracting the enemy by a
demonstration to the south-east of Colesburg. Consequently the shells
from nowhere began to pour into their laager during breakfast
(January 12) with devastating results. The laager was instantly
abandoned, and a second, two thousand yards farther off, suffered the
same fate. When Butcher had finally been able to get a second
15-pounder up the hill, the Boers were compelled to shift every camp
they possessed into sheltered positions.

Most of these exploits show the resource and the daring which mark
French's tactics. But his caution is no less remarkable. One instance
of it will suffice. Shortly after the Coles Kop incident, it was
discovered that the Boers had left open a portion of the road from