riding was not good, and they were very inferior in numbers, and hence
were only enabled to fulfil generally the rôle of Divisional Cavalry,
which they appear to have done very well. The cause of failure on the
Russian side is to be found in the fact that for years they have been
trained on _exactly the same principles_ which these writers now
advocate. They were devoid of real Cavalry training, they thought of
nothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence they
lamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a display
of the highest form of Cavalry spirit."

On the other hand Sir John French protests against the tendency to
_ultra-caution_ in handling cavalry at manoeuvres. The cavalry charge
is always a risk. The risk taken by the Field-Marshal, for instance,
when he ordered the famous charge which won him the way to Kimberley,
would certainly have been regarded as fatal at official manoeuvres. It
is absurd, he insists, that the umpires should call on cavalry to
surrender the moment that they come face to face with an infantry
fire. Such a moment may be the cavalry's great opportunity.

[Page Heading: VIEWS ON CAVALRY]

Many of the modern armies, he holds, are suffering from cavalry
without confidence. And there is abundant evidence to justify the
charge. Bernhardi has pointed out that the phenomenal successes of the
German cavalry in the war of 1870-1 were due not to its own
extraordinary valour, but to the absence of opposition on the part of
the French. Von Moltke made a similar criticism (which Sir John French
approves) on the Prussian cavalry after the war of 1866. "Our cavalry
failed," he wrote, "perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in
_self-confidence_. All its initiative had been destroyed at