Employments, or take Pensions from the Court; is least liable to
Corruption; wou'd prevent exorbitant Expence, and soonest destroy the
pernicious Practice of drinking and bribing for Elections, or is most
conformable to ancient Custom. The Law that lately pass'd with so much
Struggle for _Triennial_ Parliaments shall content me, till the
_Legislative_ shall think fit to make them _Annual_.

But methinks (and this I write with great Submission and Deference) that
(since the passing that Act) it seems inconsistent with the Reason of
the thing, and preposterous, for the _first_ Parliament after any
Prince's _Accession_ to the _Crown_, to give the publick Revenue _arising
by Taxes_, for a longer time than that _Parliament's own Duration_. I
cannot see why the Members of the _first_ Parliament shou'd (as the Case
now stands) engross to themselves all the Power of giving, as well as
all the Merit and Rewards due to such a Gift: and why _succeeding_
Parliaments shou'd not, in their turn, have it in their Power to oblige
the Prince, or to streighten him, if they saw Occasion; and pare his
Nails, if they were convinced he made _ill Use_ of such a _Revenue_. I
am sure we have had Instances of this Kind; and a wise Body of Senators
ought always to provide against the worst that might happen. The
_Honey-Moon_ of _Government_ is a dangerous Season; the Rights and
Liberties of the People run a greater Risk at that time, thro their own
Representatives Compliments and Compliances, than they are ever likely
to do during that Reign: and 'tis safer to break this Practice, when we
have the Prospect of a good and gracious Prince upon the Throne, than
when we have an inflexible Person, who thinks every Offer an Affront,
which comes not up to the Height of what his Predecessor had, without
considering whether it were well or ill done at first.

The Revenues of our Kings, for many Ages, arose out of their