Behind the first-line army so organized, a second-line army of larger
size, tho far less trained, and so designed that it could be expanded,
was organized. This was the citizen or "Territorial" army, consisting in
time of peace of fourteen divisions of infantry and artillery and
fourteen brigades of cavalry, with the appropriate medical, sanitary,
transport and other auxiliary services. Those serving in this
second-line army were civilians, and, of course, much less disciplined
than the officers and men of the first line. Its primary function was
home defense, but its members were encouraged to undertake for service
abroad, if necessary; and a large part of this army, in point of fact,
fought in France, Flanders and in the East soon after the beginning of
the war, in great measure making up by intelligence for shortness of
training.

To say, therefore, that we were caught unprepared is not accurate.
Compulsory service in a period of peace was out of the question for us.
Moreover, it would have taken at least two generations to organize, and
meanwhile we should have been weaker than without it. We had studied the
situation and had done the only thing we thought we could do, after full
deliberation. Our main strength was in our Navy and its tradition. Our
secondary contribution was a small army fashioned to fulfil a
scientifically measured function. It was, of course, a very small army,
but it had a scientific organization on the basis of which a great
expansion was possible. After all, what we set ourselves to accomplish
we did accomplish. If the margin by which a just sufficient success was
attained in the early days of the war seems to-day narrow, the reason of
the narrow margin lay largely in the unprepared condition of the armies
of Russia, on which we and France had reckoned for rapid co-operation.
Anyhow, we fulfilled our contract, for at eleven o'clock on Monday
morning, August 3, 1914, we mobilized without a hitch the whole of the