quite natural. He desired no quarrel, and the whole fault was
Delcassé's, who had wanted to pick a quarrel and bring England into it.

I told the Emperor that, if he would allow me to speak my mind freely, I
would do so. He assented, and I said to him that his attitude had caused
great uneasiness in England, and that this, and not any notion of
forming a tripartite alliance of France, Russia, and England against
him, was the reason of the feeling there had been. We were bound by no
military alliance. As for our entente, some time since we had
difficulties with France over Newfoundland and Egypt, and we had made a
good business arrangement (_gutes Geschäft_) about these complicated
matters of detail, and had simply carried out our word to France.

He said that he had no criticism to make on this, except that if we had
told him so early there would have been no misunderstanding. Things were
better now, but we had not always been pleasant to him and ready to meet
him. His army was for defense, not for offense. As to Russia, he had no
Himalayas between him and Russia, more was the pity. Now what about our
Two-Power standard. All this was said with earnestness, but in a
friendly way, the Emperor laying his finger on my shoulder as he spoke.
Sometimes the conversation was in German, but often in English.

I said that our fleet was like his Majesty's army. It was of the _Wesen_
of the nation, and the Two-Power standard, while it might be rigid and
so awkward, was a way of maintaining a deep-seated national tradition,
and a Liberal Government must hold to it as firmly as a Conservative.
Both countries were increasing in wealth--ours, like Germany, very
rapidly--and if Germany built we must build. But, I added, there was an
excellent opportunity for co-operation in other things. I instanced
international free trade developments which would smooth other