discriminating between the possible and the impossible, and has not
broken down in the task which for greatly gifted natures is the most
difficult of all--the task of recognizing, when on the pinnacle of
success, its natural limits. What was possible he performed, and never
left the possible good undone for the sake of the impossible better;
never disdained at least to mitigate by palliatives evils that were
incurable. But where he recognized that fate had spoken, he always
obeyed. Alexander on the Hypanis, Napoleon at Moscow, turned back
because they were compelled to do so, and were indignant at destiny for
bestowing even on its favorites merely limited successes. Cæsar turned
back voluntarily on the Thames and on the Rhine, and thought of
carrying into effect even at the Danube and the Euphrates, not unbounded
plans of world-conquest, but merely well-considered frontier
regulations."

If only Germany, whose great historian thus explained these things, had
remembered them, how different might have been her position to-day. But
it may be that she had carried her policy too far to be left free. With
her certainly rests the main responsibility for what has happened; for
apart from her, Austria would not have acted as she did, nor would
Turkey, nor Bulgaria. The fascinating glitter of her armies, and the
assurances given by her General Staff, were too much for the minor
nations whom she had induced to accept her guidance, and too much I
think also for her own people. No doubt the ignorance of these about the
ways of their own Government counted for a great deal. There has never
been such a justification of the principle of democratic control as this
war affords. But a nation must be held responsible for the action of its
own rulers, however much it has simply submitted itself to them. I have
the impression that even to-day in its misery the German public does not
fully understand, and still believes that Germany was the victim of a