The war has not altered the views to which I had then come.

But it was not really so on either side, and it is deplorable that the
two nations knew so little of each other. For I believe that the German
system, wholly unadapted as it was to the modern spirit, was bound to
become modified before long, and had we shown more skill and more zeal
in explaining ourselves, we should probably have accelerated the process
of German acceptance of the true tendencies of the age. But our
statesmen took little trouble to get first-hand knowledge of the genesis
of what appeared to them to be the German double dose of original sin,
and, on the other hand, our chauvinists were studied in Germany out of
all proportion to their small number and influence. Thus the Berlin
politicians got the wrong notions to which their tradition predisposed
them. I believe that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was himself really more
enlightened, but he could not control the admirals and generals, or the
economists or historians or professors whom the admirals and generals
were always trying to enlist on the side of the doctrine of _Weltmacht
oder Niedergang_. Under these circumstances all that seemed possible was
to try to influence German opinion, and at the same time to insure
against the real risk of failure to accomplish this before it was too
late.

In order to make this view of German conditions intelligible, it will be
convenient in the first place to give some account of Herr von Bethmann
Hollweg's opinions as expressed in his book, and afterward to contrast
them with the views of his powerful colleague, Admiral von Tirpitz.

The ex-Imperial Chancellor commences his "_Betrachtungen zum
Weltkriege_" by going back to the day when he assumed office. When