not. She might have grumbled, as Bismarck used to do, over our apparent
indefiniteness. But that indefiniteness in policy was only apparent. Its
form was due to the habit of mind which was, what it always has been and
probably always will be, the habit of mind of the people of these
islands. It was the defect of her qualities that prevented Germany from
understanding what this habit of mind truly imported, and we have never
fully taken in at any period of our history how little she has ever
understood it. Let anyone who doubts this read the German memoirs which
have appeared since the war. But it remains not the less true and
obvious that the purpose of the British Government which fashioned the
policy in question was to leave no stone unturned in the endeavor to
find a way of keeping the peace between Germany and the Entente Powers.
Now success in that endeavor was not a certainty, and it was necessary
to insure against the risk of failure. The second branch of British
policy related to the provision for defense rendered imperative by the
element of uncertainty which was unavoidable. The duty of the
Government of this country was to make sure that, if their endeavor to
preserve peace failed, the country should be prepared, in the best way
of those that were practicable, to face the situation that might emerge.

Impetuous persons ask why, if there was even a chance of a great
European war in which we might be involved, we did not appreciate the
magnitude of what was at stake, and, laying everything else aside,
concentrate our efforts on the immediate fashioning of such vast
military forces as we possessed toward the end of the war? The answer
will be found in the fourth chapter. We were aware of the risk, and we
took what we thought the best means to meet it. Had we tried to do what
we are reproached for not having done, we must have become weaker before
we could have become stronger. For this statement I have given the
military reasons. In a time of peace, even if the country had assented