hostile to Austria, and consequently to her Ally. In the case of France,
again, it was indeed true that M. Jules Cambon had repeatedly emphasized
to the ex-Chancellor the desire for more intimate relations between
France and Germany. But the French had never forgiven the driving of
Delcassé out of office, and the result of the Algeciras conference had
not healed the wound. Besides this, there was the undying question of
Alsace-Lorraine.

The outcome of the precarious situation, says the ex-Chancellor, was
that England, following her traditional policy of balancing the Powers
of Europe, was taking a firm position on the side of France and Russia,
while Germany was increasing her naval power and giving a very definite
direction to her policy in the East. The commercial rivalry between
England and Germany was being rendered acute politically by the growth
of the German fleet. In this state of things Bethmann Hollweg formed the
opinion that there was only one thing that could be done, to aim at
withdrawing from the Dual Alliance the backing of England for its
anti-German policy. The Emperor entirely agreed with him, and it was
resolved to attempt to attain this purpose by coming to an understanding
with England.

Reading between the lines, it is pretty obvious that the ex-Chancellor
was at times embarrassed by the public utterances of his imperial
Master. Him he defends throughout the book with conspicuous loyalty, and
is emphatic about his desire to keep the peace, a desire founded in
religious conviction. But the Emperor's way was to see only one thing
at the moment. I translate[5] a passage from his Chancellor's book:

"If from time to time he indulged in passionate expressions about
the strong position in the world of Germany, his desire was that