intervened.

As to the rest of the narrative in the ex-Chancellor's book, this is not
the place to deal with it. His view that Germany was doing her best to
moderate the rash action in Vienna which resulted in the declaration of
war on Serbia, while England was doing much less to restrain the course
of events at St. Petersburg, is not one which it is easy to bring into
harmony with the documents published. This is a part of the history of
events before the war which has already been exhaustively dealt with by
others, and it is no part of the purpose of these pages to write of
matters about which I have no first-hand knowledge. For I had little
opportunity of taking any direct part in our affairs with Germany after
my final visit to that country, which was in 1912. My duties as Lord
Chancellor were too engrossing.

There are, however, in this connection just two topics toward the end of
the book which are of such interest that I will refer to them before
passing away from it. The first is the story that there was a Crown
Council at Potsdam on July 5, 1914, at which the Emperor determined on
war. This Herr von Bethmann Hollweg denies. He explains that in the
morning of that day the Austrian Ambassador lunched with the Emperor,
presumably at Potsdam, and took the opportunity of handing to him a
letter written by the Emperor of Austria personally, together with a
memorandum on policy drawn up in Vienna. This memorandum contained a
detailed plan for opposing Russian enterprise in the Balkan peninsula by
energetic diplomatic pressure. Against a hostile Serbia and an
unreliable Roumania resort was to be had to Bulgaria and Turkey, with a
view to the establishment of a Balkan League, excluding Serbia, to be
formed under the ægis of the Central Powers. The Serajevo murder was
declared to have demonstrated the aggressive and irreconcilable