world knew that the real cause was the jealousy and hatred felt for
England by a certain class of United States citizens who "were bound to
pick a quarrel with John Bull, excuse or no excuse." That there were
many and irritating faults on the part of England cannot be denied. In
the light of subsequent events it is not difficult to realize that both
governments were in the wrong. The wisdom born of bitter experience and
the sincere friendship of the two nations to-day, sensibly founded on
mutual respect, happily renders a repetition of such regrettable scenes
outside the pale of possibility.

Strange to say, England had revoked the objectionable Order-in-Council
authorizing right of search of American ships for deserters by British
men-of-war the very day _before_ war was declared by the United States.
There was no ocean cable in those days. Had there been, this story might
never have been written. The removal, however, of this one reason for
_war_ was not--when letters duly arrived from England announcing the
fact--accepted by the United States as a reason for an immediate
declaration of _peace_. This proves that the reasons advanced by the
United States for going to war were from first to last not genuine, but
mere excuses. Canada was as Naboth's vineyard, and Ahab, in the person
of the United States, coveted it. England hesitated to draw the sword on
a people "speaking a common tongue, with institutions based upon her
own," but she could not always be expected to "turn the other cheek to
the smiter."

The United States called out an army of 15,000 men for purposes of
attack on the Niagara frontier, and commanded General Wadsworth--of
course, on paper--"to feed and cherish them." How well he executed this
command remains to be seen.