He talked chiefly of the strangeness of this confounded war. It was
exactly like a sanitary engineer speaking of the unexpected difficulties
of some particularly nasty inundation. He made little stiff horizontal
gestures with his hands. First one had to build a dam and stop the rush
of it, so; then one had to organise the push that would send it back. He
explained the organisation of the push. They had got an organisation
now that was working out most satisfactorily. Had I seen a sector? I
had seen the sector of Soissons. Yes, but that was not now an offensive
sector. I must see an offensive sector; see the whole method. Lieutenant
de Tessin must see that that was arranged....

Neither he nor his two colleagues spoke of the Germans with either
hostility or humanity. Germany for them is manifestly merely an
objectionable Thing. It is not a nation, not a people, but a nuisance.
One has to build up this great counter-thrust bigger and stronger until
they go back. The war must end in Germany. The French generals have
no such delusions about German science or foresight or capacity as
dominates the smart dinner chatter of England. One knows so well that
detestable type of English folly, and its voice of despair: "They _plan_
everything. They foresee everything." This paralysing Germanophobia is
not common among the French. The war, the French generals said, might
take--well, it certainly looked like taking longer than the winter. Next
summer perhaps. Probably, if nothing unforeseen occurred, before a full
year has passed the job might be done. Were any surprises in store? They
didn't seem to think it was probable that the Germans had any surprises
in store.... The Germans are not an inventive people; they are merely a
thorough people. One never knew for certain.

Is any greater contrast possible than between so implacable, patient,