ahead of the men and making them move about mechanically at the word of
command, has ceased. On the British side our magnificent new subalterns
and our equally magnificent new non-commissioned officers play the part
of captains of football teams; they talk their men individually into
an understanding of the job before them; they criticise style and
performance. On the French side things have gone even farther. Every man
in certain attacks has been given a large scale map of the ground over
which he has to go, and has had his own individual job clearly marked
and explained to him. All the Allied infantrymen tend to become
specialised, as bombers, as machine-gun men, and so on. The
unspecialised common soldier, the infantryman who has stood and marched
and moved in ranks and ranks, the "serried lines of men," who are the
main substance of every battle story for the last three thousand years,
are as obsolete as the dodo. The rifle and bayonet very probably are
becoming obsolete too. Knives and clubs and revolvers serve better in
the trenches. The krees and the Roman sword would be as useful. The fine
flourish of the bayonet is only possible in the rare infrequent open.
Even the Zulu assegai would serve as well.

The two operations of the infantry attack now are the rush and the
"scrap." These come after the artillery preparation. Against the rush,
the machine gun is pitted. The machine gun becomes lighter and more and
more controllable by one man; as it does so the days of the rifle draw
to a close. Against the machine gun we are now directing the "Tank,"
which goes ahead and puts out the machine gun as soon as it begins to
sting the infantry rush. We are also using the swooping aeroplane with a
machine gun. Both these devices are of British origin, and they promise
very well.

After the rush and the scrap comes the organisation of the captured