"And it came to pass when Napoleon had not yet been a full year at
Elba, that he said unto his men of war that clave unto him, Go to, let
us go back to France, and fight against King Lewis, and thrust him out
from being king. So he departed, he and six hundred men with him that
drew the sword, and warred against King Lewis. Then all the men of
Belial gathered themselves together, and said, God save Napoleon. And
when Lewis saw that, he fled, and gat him into the land of Batavia:
and Napoleon ruled over France," &c. &c. &c.[17]

Now if a free-thinking philosopher—one of those who advocate the
cause of unbiassed reason, and despise pretended revelations—were to
meet with such a tissue of absurdities as this in an old Jewish
record, would he not reject it at once as too palpable an
imposture[18] to deserve even any inquiry into its evidence? Is that
credible then of the civilized Europeans now, which could not, if
reported of the semi-barbarous Jews 3000 years ago, be established by
any testimony? Will it be answered, that "there is nothing
_supernatural_ in all this?" Why is it, then, that you object to what
is _supernatural_—that you reject every account of _miracles_—if not
because they are _improbable_? Surely then a story equally or still
more improbable, is not to be implicitly received, merely on the
ground that it is _not_ miraculous: though in fact, as I have already
(in note, p. 39,) shown from Hume's authority, it _is_ really
miraculous. The opposition to Experience has been proved to be as
complete in this case, as in what are commonly called miracles; and
the reasons assigned for that contrariety by the defenders of _them_,
cannot be pleaded in the present instance. If then philosophers, who
reject every wonderful story that is maintained by priests, are yet
found ready to believe _everything else_, however improbable, they