of the battle in Belgium, the most that is seen of the enemy is but a
passing glimpse. If the Higher Command decide that to give battle in any
determined measure would be to expose their force to unnecessary chances
of defeat, and to endanger the ultimate success of the campaign, it is
very unlikely that the infantry soldier will see his enemy at a distance
of less than five or six hundred yards. There is always the danger, if
the enemy are allowed to come to close quarters, that the defenders will
find themselves so pinned to their ground that it is impossible to
extricate themselves from their position without losses of greater
magnitude than would be warranted by the success obtained. So far this
Division, at any rate, had succeeded in their mission of delaying the
enemy by forcing him to deploy, at the same time taking the greatest
care to refuse open battle.

Most of the younger Subalterns had very primitive ideas on the general
strategy of the campaign. There would be a wait, they thought, as the
English Army would probably be used as general reserve; then there would
be "the devil of a battle," ending in Victory or Defeat, and followed by
a glorious life (or death), and that would be the end of the matter. It
would be over by Christmas, "easy." The actual course of events was very
different. The English had encountered the enemy in the first onslaught
of battle, and there had been neither Victory nor Defeat--nothing but
retreat, retreat, retreat, over twenty miles a day, in the blazing heat
of sunny France, with the fear of capture for those who lagged
behind....

The fighting was not like those battles on Laffans Plain, where you
fought quickly and decisively, and where, "win, draw, or lose," you were
home in time for tea. You were told all about it beforehand by the
Colonel, or Brigadier, and sometimes the "show" approached interest.