the month of May, and again in the month of August, he repeated that
offer; and as he received no satisfactory answer, he declared, that as
the great military movements which surrounded, crossed, or drained his
kingdom, were such as to excite his apprehension that his entire
destruction was meditated, "he took up arms, because circumstances
imperiously called upon him to do so, deeming it far preferable to die
sword in hand than to fall with disgrace."

It was said at the same time, that Frederick secretly offered to
Alexander to give him possession of Graudentz, and his magazines, and
to put himself at the head of his insurgent subjects, if the Russian
army should advance into Silesia. If the same authorities are to be
believed, Alexander received this proposition, very favourably. He
immediately sent to Bagration and Wittgenstein sealed marching orders.
They were instructed not to open them until they received another letter
from their sovereign, which he never wrote, having changed his
resolution. A variety of causes might have dictated that change; 1st, a
wish not to be the first to commence so great a war, and his anxiety to
have divine justice and the opinion of mankind on his side, by not
appearing the aggressor; 2d, that Frederick, becoming less uneasy as to
the plans of Napoleon, had resolved to follow his fortunes. It is
probable, after all, that the noble sentiments which Alexander expressed
in his reply to the king were his only motives: we are assured that he
wrote to him, "That in a war which might begin by reverses, and in which
perseverance was required, he only felt courageous for himself, and that
the misfortunes of an ally might shake his resolution; that it would
grieve him to chain Prussia to his fortune if it was bad; that if it was
good he should always be ready to share it with her, whatever line of
conduct necessity might oblige her to pursue."