restitution of the two latter provinces was only stipulated by an
armistice, the conditions of which were never meant to be executed. But
as Napoleon professed to be the mediator between Mustapha and Alexander,
the ministers of the two powers repaired to Paris. But there, during
the long continuance of that feigned mediation, the Turkish
plenipotentiaries were never admitted to his presence.

If we must even tell the whole truth, it is asserted, that at the
interview at Tilsit, and subsequently, a treaty for the partition of
Turkey was under discussion. It was proposed to Russia to take
possession of Wallachia, Moldavia, Bulgaria, and a part of Mount Hemus.
Austria was to have Servia and a part of Bosnia; France the other part
of that province, Albania, Macedonia, and all Greece as far as
Thessalonica: Constantinople, Adrianople, and Thrace, were to be left to
the Turks.

Whether the conferences respecting this partition were really of a
serious nature, or merely the communication of a great idea, is
uncertain; so much is certain, that shortly after the interview at
Tilsit, Alexander's ambition was very sensibly moderated. The
suggestions of prudence had shown him the danger of substituting for the
ignorant, infatuated, and feeble Turkey, an active, powerful, and
unaccommodating neighbour. In his conversations on the subject at that
time, he remarked, "that he had already too much desert country; that he
knew too well, by the occupation of the Crimea, which was still
depopulated, the value of conquest over foreign and hostile religions
and manners; that besides, France and Russia were too strong to become
such near neighbours; that two such powerful bodies coming into
immediate contact, would be sure to jostle; and that it was much better
to leave intermediate powers between them."