the battle of Auerstadt, and his order of the day at Wagram, in which
he had assumed the honour of that victory. He also spoke reproachfully
of his character, as being much more ambitious than patriotic; and
perhaps of the fascination of his manners,--all of them things
considered dangerous to a recently established government; and yet he
had showered rank, titles, and distinctions upon him, while Bernadotte,
always ungrateful, seemed to accept them merely as in justice due to his
merits, or to the want which was felt of him. These complaints of
Napoleon were not without foundation.

Bernadotte, on his side, abusing the emperor's moderation and desire to
keep on terms with him, gradually incurred an increase of his
displeasure, which his ambition was pleased to call enmity. He demanded
why Napoleon had placed him in such a dangerous and false position at
Wagram? why the report of that victory had been so unfavourable to him?
to what was he to attribute the jealous anxiety to weaken his eulogium
in the journals by artful notes? Up to that time, however, the obscure
and underhand opposition of this general to his emperor had been of no
importance; but a much wider field was then opened to their
misunderstanding.

By the treaty of Tilsit, Sweden, as well as Turkey, had been sacrificed
to Russia and the continental system. The mistaken or mad politics of
Gustavus IV. had been the cause of this. Ever since 1804 that monarch
appeared to have enlisted himself in the pay of England; it was he also
who had been the first to break the ancient alliance between France and
Sweden. He had obstinately persevered in that false policy to such an
extent at first, as to contend against France when she was victorious
over Russia, and afterwards with Russia and France united. The loss of
Pomerania, in 1807, and even that of Finland and the islands of Aland,